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The article focuses on the aftermath of the colour revolutions by analysing and
questioning the real success, as often depicted by the West, of democracy
promotion in the East European region. First of all, the article challenges the
conventional logic of democracy promotion – even when backed by moral
reasoning and resource availability – as sufficient and adequate for
instigating democratic change in non-liberal regimes. By examining the case
of Belarus it further contends that authoritarian regimes effectively learn to
resist and counteract foreign-led democracy promotion, and often do so
legitimately, with a minimal use of force. The article concludes that in order
to exercise democracy promotion (if such a thing is possible at all) a far
deeper understanding of autocratic narratives is needed, associated with a
much closer look at societal norms and values, as well as an individual
country’s geopolitical resources and strategies.
Keywords: colour revolutions; democracy promotion; Belarus; authoritarian
regimes; societal norms and values
There will be no revolution in Belarus . . . Those who entice democratisation in the
former Soviet Union are yet to rip off the fruit of their actions . . .1
The early 2000s witnessed a series of events which later became popularized as
‘colour revolutions’.2 These public protests, which often adopted a colour as a
symbol, included the ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia (2003), ‘Orange Revolution’
in Ukraine (2004) and the ‘Tulip Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan (2005).3 They were
arguably successful in overthrowing previous authoritarian regimes and facilitating
democratic breakthroughs.4 Moreover, in their strikingly similar patterns, and
involvement of Western non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as part of the
international diffusion process, they all centred on elections as the key mechanism
for challenging the incumbency.
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The ‘second generation’ of similar events (2005–2009), however, was unam-
biguously less successful. In 2005–2006 revolutionary attempts were made across
a number of states of the Former Soviet Union (Russia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan and Belarus), with comparable events initiated and equally failing
elsewhere.5 Many of these undertakings were effectively thwarted before they
occurred, and others were sweepingly suppressed, with a minimal use of force.
This necessarily raises a question – which also opens up a wider debate on ‘democ-
racy promotion’ in the region – whether the autocratic regimes have learned to
resist and even counteract externally promoted ‘electoral revolutions’.
There is no straightforward answer to this question. As some scholars observe,6
for many autocratic regimes witnessing what were widely perceived as feigned
revolutionary activities in their neighbourhood, the urgency to learn to prevent
their subversive effect became realpolitik thus necessitating moderately oppressive
tactics concomitant with open hostility to ‘rapacious Western interests’.7 However,
regimes’ learning is only one side of the story, which would be incomplete without
contextualizing each ‘non-colour’ case with the purpose of understanding the real
(far deeper) reasons behind the failed (foreign-led) revolutionary enticement.
Belarus as ‘the last dictatorship in Europe’ serves as a curious testimony to these
uncanny logics of ‘democracy promotion’ and ‘autocratic diffusion’8 revealing
its own and not-so-authoritarian narrative with which the ‘dictatorship’ withstood
its electoral turmoil in 2006.9
On both the day itself and the day after the presidential election in March 2006,
protestors took their discontent to the streets of Minsk, thus closely following the
Democratic Revolutionary Handbook.10 Prior to this, many young revolutionaries
travelled as far afield as Serbia and Ukraine to learn about the strategies and tactics
of regime subversion to be applied in their own home. This consequently resulted
in a 10,000-strong public protest on the day of the election,11 a five-day camp
resistance under physically and emotionally strenuous conditions, occasional
clashes with riot police, and over 1000 arrests in the aftermath of the event.12 In
other words, the prerequisites to galvanize an ‘electoral revolution’ were evidently
present in Belarus, but somehow failed to develop into a wider mass mobilization,
despite the fact that the majority of Belarusians (70%), according to an IISEPS
opinion poll,13 were aware of and even discussed the event with their close
friends and relations. This surprising public withdrawal from allegedly a
‘people’s event’ is even more surprising when we consider the relatively moderate
use of violence by authorities (including their actions prior to and during the
event),14 and the feeble and often embarrassing attempts of the state media to
conceal the reality.15 In other words, contrary to the anticipated draconian
measures of Lukashenko’s dictatorship, only limited (and largely non-violent)
state interference was used to counteract insurgencies.
In the light of the revolutionary ‘contagion’ and seemingly propitious con-
ditions for popular mobilization, why did the Belarusians not rise up against the
‘outpost of tyranny’? Evidently, the country was as far away from a ‘tipping





























constitutive elements: a people’s desire to rise and governors’ inability to rule.16
Interestingly, this kind of ‘controversy’ of allegedly people’s revolutions is not
solely attributable to the ‘exceptional’ case of Belarus; instead, it appears to be
broadly illustrative of far deeper problems related to ‘democracy promotion’ and
‘autocratic resilience’ in the region.17 In this article I limit myself to an analysis
of nuances of the 2006 attempt at democracy promotion in Belarus. I focus on
efforts by the anti-regime opposition, encouraged by the West. I also seek to
explain the government’s response to it. In what follows, I will first discuss the
limitations of the precarious ‘international diffusion’ model that has explicitly
dominated the debate on ‘colour revolutions’, and will offer some counter-points
premised on Lane’s argument of ‘revolutionary coup d’e´tat’.18 In the second part
of this article, I will examine Way’s theory of structural factors19 in order to
evaluate the Belarusian response to colour revolutions in more detail. The ‘struc-
tural factors’ perspective, here interpreted more broadly, is not only essential for
understanding the reasons of success/failure of the recent attempt at ‘international
diffusion’ in Eastern Europe, but also for far deeper understanding of why demo-
cratization by Western design may not necessarily succeed in the region, despite
the perceived leverage of or linkage with the West.20 Finally (and by way of
conclusion) I will discuss the relevance of legitimacy that underpins Lukashenko’s
regime thus alluding to a possible counterintuitive ‘balance’ between publicly
perceived societal needs and values, and respective government performance,
the understanding of which somewhat shifts the focus of ‘democracy promotion’
from the impatient ‘when’ to the improbable ‘if’, thus questioning whether
external democracy promotion may succeed in Eastern Europe and elsewhere by
similar means.
International diffusion or revolutionary coup d’e´tat?
Much of the recent literature written on colour revolutions focuses on ‘international
diffusion’ as a mechanism of emulating successful narratives of ‘democracy
promotion’ in the region – through training and sharing ideas and resources to
direct involvement – with the intention to overthrow existing autocratic
regimes.21 This scholarship has been particularly influential in debating successful
international diffusion (after the trials in Southern Europe in the late 1990s) in
the recent ‘colour’ cases of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Yet it appears far
less comprehensive for dealing with those less victorious stories that by far
dominate the ‘second tide’ of the ‘colour revolutions’ from 2005 onwards, and
therefore needs closer examination in order to understand why some ‘revolutions’
fail and ‘how Western policy misses the mark’.22
According to Bunce and Wolchik, ‘diffusion can be defined as a process
wherein new ideas, institutions, policies, models or repertoires of behaviour
spread geographically . . . whether within a given state or across states’.23 In the
case of Eastern Europe, it refers to ‘an electoral model of democratisation’ that





























in Serbia in 2000, whereby trained opposition activists use fraudulent elections to
mobilize popular support to defeat weak autocratic incumbents.
By aiming to introduce ‘democracy from below’, all these revolutionary activi-
ties shared a common strategy: targeting the removal of incumbency through mass
protests occurring within a constitutional framework (non-violent), focusing on
allegedly fraudulent electoral procedures and drawing on young and enthusiastic
activists to form the core for mobilizing larger crowds by conventional and other
means, including popular entertainment and modern technology (use of mobile
phones, internet and media resources).24
Furthermore, as Bunce and Wolchik assert,25 in order to make international
diffusion ‘available for possible export’, a set of three factors should be met.
First of all, potential revolutionaries need to closely follow the electoral model,
which offers a range of strategies and tactics as to how to topple the incumbent
regime26; second, the importing countries should have similar conditions – ‘put
succinctly, common contexts and common identities’; and finally, there should
exist ‘collaborative networks’ that ‘cross the boundaries’ and ‘provide incentives
for actors on both sides of the diffusion process to embrace transplantation’.27
The relevance of the third factor for ‘democracy promotion’ in the region, and
especially for the occurrence of ‘the colour revolutions’, should not be underesti-
mated,28 as it has essentially – through the provision of logistical, intellectual and
financial resources – been the driving force of international diffusion in Eastern
Europe. Open and unabashed exposure of Western involvement and sponsorship
– being part of these ‘collaborative networks’ – were indisputably a key feature
of regional democracy promotion. International NGOs and aid organizations
were particularly instrumental for the promotion and organization of large-scale
entertainment events including payments to the attendees themselves.29 As Way
contends:
Transnational networks of previously successful activists, with assistance from the
US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other organisations as
well as from experts in non-violent protest such as Gene Sharp, are credited with sti-
mulating transitions in countries that lacked sufficient prerequisites for revolution and
where the fall of autocrats was ‘not predicated by most analysts’.30
Drawing on the scale and arguable success of the first electoral revolutions in
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, and their repetitive character, some scholars
even suggested conceptualizing them as an instance of modular development pre-
mised on the imitation or indeed emulation of ‘the prior successful example of
others’.31 In Beissinger’s interpretation, for example, all these revolutionary activi-
ties should not be viewed as independent cases, ‘but rather [as] an interrelated
modular phenomenon in which opposition groups borrowed frames, strategies,
repertoires, and even logos from previously successful efforts and gained inspi-
ration from the acts of others’.32 He further insists that if all structural advantages





























of electoral uprisings in the region based on the electoral cycles of the existing
regimes.33
Yet there are a number of reasons to believe that modular diffusion has run its
course in the region, and even more, that its allegedly successful first trials clearly
failed to produce any noticeable change of regime, let alone to achieve democra-
tization.34 On reflection, it becomes apparent that while these ‘revolutions’ may
have been legitimated in democratic terms by involving some ‘staged’ mass
activities, they should be more appropriately termed not as ‘people’s events’, but
instead as ‘revolutionary coup d’e´tat’35 aided by Western sponsorship. These
‘colour cases’, as Lane asserts further, ‘were more than palace putsches but they
were not classical revolutions’,36 either in their intentions or their outcome.
They did involve some mass mobilization but they did not produce any system/
regime change. Instead, what seems to have occurred is the instalment of new
political incumbents instigated through the agency of mass popular support and
Western orchestration.37
These electoral revolutions, especially those of the second (2005–2009) gen-
eration, which Chaulia suitably depicted as ‘political convulsions’38 have evidently
failed to take into account domestic circumstances (including the precarious
legitimacy) of some existing autocracies, and instead focused on maximizing
‘electoral opportunities’ in a situation when oppositional forces explicitly
struggled or indeed were unable to mobilize public support for a legitimate transfer
of power. As David Lane qualifies it further:
What is portrayed in the media as ‘people’s power’ is in reality an elite manipulated
demonstration. While the masses may be captivated by euphoric revolutionary ideol-
ogy, they are in political terms instrumentalities of indigenous counter elites, often
encouraged by foreigners with their own agendas. If successful, rather than such revo-
lutions leading to significant socio-political change, a circulation of elites follows the
ousting of former rulers or their cooption into a new elite structure.39
This is precisely what happened as a result of the first ‘wave’ of colour takeovers:
not a regime change but a change of governing elite in countries like Georgia,
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan now being popularly associated with anarchy, corruption
and new forms of authoritarianism.40 On the contrary, the ‘second generation’
of colour changeovers has managed to maintain the existing status quo thus
resisting (with a minimal use of force) the temptation of externally orchestrated
revolutions. Belarus offers a particularly striking example of how the ‘revolution-
ary contagion’ failed to mobilize the masses, and exposes the need to explore the
roots of public ‘inertia’ with reference to regime legitimacy and societal values –
the principal focus of this article.
Interestingly, in many cases of ‘revolutionary coup d’e´tat’ of the second gener-
ation especially – that is, involving mass protest but no system change per se41 – a
single crucial element was clearly missing – that of ‘domestic receptivity’.42
Without considering each case individually it is difficult to generalize whether





























actions by the autocratic regimes, or more broadly, due to the indigenous conditions
(including structural and psychological predispositions of the population) unsuita-
ble for making revolutions. In either circumstance, a simple wisdom related to the
promotion of internal change through manipulation of societal norms and values –
Nye’s formula44 – which was placed at the heart of the US-led ‘colour revolutions’
in Eastern Europe45 was evidently wrong-handled here. In his earlier work Nye
explicitly claimed that only those ‘countries that are closest to global norms of
liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy; those with the most access to multiple chan-
nels of communication; and those whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic
and international performance’46 are likely to gain from international diffusion, in
undertaking their (r)evolutionary change. The countries of the second generation of
‘colour democratic breakthroughs’, no matter how advantageous their electoral
opportunitiesmay have been, evidently failed tomeet these criteria thus underlining
the importance of contextualizing ‘democracy promotion’ for each given case, and
considering structural factors propitious or otherwise for undertaking regime
change with external assistance. In the meantime, following the commentary of
RIA-Novosti, one needs to emphasize that ‘presidential elections in Belarus, and
their aftermath, showed that “orange” technologies may be applicable even in
Belarusian conditions, but they may not necessarily be effective’.47
Structural factors: regime’s learning curve
Contrary to the wisdom of ‘external democracy promotion’, Way argues that ‘dif-
fusion may explain fewer aspects of recent postcommunist revolutions than is
sometimes argued’.48 What matters instead are the structural factors that lay foun-
dations for any possible change to occur, and which may eventually develop into a
revolutionary situation, with de-legitimation of the incumbent authority. Experien-
cing international ‘contagion’ on one’s doorstep and having domestic revolution-
aries trained in accordance with theDemocratic Revolutionary Handbook49 are not
sufficient ‘ingredients’ to initiate a revolution a` la carte. Way asserts that ‘revolu-
tions have often failed even when oppositions have adopted the “right” strategies
from abroad. The most striking case is Belarus, which garnered serious attention
and input from Serb, Slovak, Ukrainian, and other activists in the run-up to the
2006 presidential elections’.50 He emphasized that ‘Lukashenka’s opponents
seemed to do everything they were supposed to and arguably followed the
“model” much more faithfully [than their counterparts]. Yet no large-scale
support materialized, and Lukashenka never came close to being unseated’.51
Instead, as Way authoritatively contends, it is the structural factors that play a
far more decisive role in explaining ‘why some postcommunist authoritarian
regimes have been more vulnerable than others to opposition threats’.52 In particu-
lar, Way singles out two broad categories of structural factors that may explain the
dynamics of recent electoral turnovers: (i) the strength of a country’s ties with the
West; and (ii) the strength of the incumbent regime’s autocratic party or state.





























exercised Western leverage over the country that led to the toppling of the previous
autocratic regimes in Georgia and Ukraine, under the well-organized activities
of the opposition. In countries where the leadership enjoys solid structural
support including psychological predispositions of the population (for example,
Belarus), little can be done externally, in order to stage full scale mobilization
and revolutionary change:
Lukashenka’s success at remaining in power has less to do with any particular
strategies adopted in response to postcommunist revolutions than with his already
overwhelming domination over the opposition.53
In other words, although revolution may have been attempted in Belarus in 2006,
arguably at the behest of the West, the endeavour clearly yielded no ‘revolutionary
situation’ there, thus highlighting the relevance of structural factors propitious
(or otherwise) for democratization.
Pre-emptive authoritarianism
In Belarus’ case, limited linkage with the West (partly instigated by the West
itself)54 and long-term pre-emptive actions of Lukashenko’s government made
the ‘colour revolution’ in Belarus destined to fail. The concept of ‘pre-emptive
authoritarianism’ was well developed by Vital Silitski55 to underline the
regime’s learning ability to survive by adopting preventative measures to
combat the democratic contagion. Over the 15 years of its struggle for survival
Lukashenko’s regime has naturally perfected the policy of pre-emption and,
more importantly, is constantly learning to survive by emulating consensus
between the regime’s performance and perceived societal needs.56 There is a
plethora of instruments that the regime can deploy – from institutional through
to cultural, ideological, tactical and other structural tools – in order to enhance
its survival skills and public satisfaction, while also learning to strike first.
It is correct to insist that over the years Lukashenko’s regime has mastered an
unlimited grip on power by actively utilizing principles and instruments of
pre-emption, and prepared well to meet the challenges of regional democratic con-
tagion. In brief,57 institutionally, to ensure legality and stability of his authority,
Lukashenko has (i) re-written the constitution thus acquiring unlimited powers
(including legislative), and removing restrictions on his stay in office; (ii) elimi-
nated noncompliant elements of society, either by legally limiting the scope for
their activities, through fear/intimidation, or by removing them physically from
the scene (as in the infamous political disappearances of 1999–2001), thus enhan-
cing the perceived efficacy of his government; (iii) installed new structural pillars
(presidential vertical; police/armed forces) to exercise minimal coercion when
necessary; and (iv) altered the format of other institutions (parliament; educational
establishments; civil society; etc.) to act in unison with presidential propaganda.
Culturally, he has (i) defeated the nationalism of the Belarusian Popular Front,





























becoming associated instead with a new type of nationalism building on a post-
transitional identity and the relative economic stability of the country; (ii)
removed from circulation any symbolic reminders of the pre-Soviet identity
(flag, literature, the use of Belarusian language for teaching); and instead (iii) pro-
moted Soviet/state patriotism and its relevant symbolic manifestations to boost
public nostalgia for the Soviet ‘nanny’ state; and (iv) inculcated public awareness
of Lukashenko’s Belarus, vividly embodied by the slogans of his election cam-
paigns ‘For Belarus’ (2001) and ‘For Independent Belarus’ (2006) which in the
eyes of many is an oasis of stability, security and equal opportunities. Ideologically,
he has (i) launched a concept of egalitarian state nationalism drawing on ‘three
essential pillars: Belarus uniqueness, unity and sovereignty’58; (ii) re-introduced
ideological education and propaganda in workplaces; (iii) actively promoted the
rise of BPSM (Belaruski Republikanski Sayuz Moladzi – Belarusian Republican
Union of Youth) by making its membership a tacit requirement for entry to high
education; and (iv) supported the activities of Belaya Rus, a popular social move-
ment staffed with Lukashenko’s supporters, as a potential foundation for building
the Party of Power, as/where necessary. Tactically, not only has Lukashenko (i) lit-
erally and otherwise decapitated, discredited and demobilized the opposition by
forcing them into their self-exile or indeed ghettoizing them into a manageable
compound; he has also (ii) learned to legally, militarily and ideologically quell
public unrest by initiating a number of laws that would thwart public mobilization
in the making.59 Finally, international pre-emption has included Lukashenko’s
joining the non-aligned states60 in 2006 to withstand the pressure of the West,
and continuously seeking Russia’s (and the Commonwealth of Independent
States’ (CIS)) political backing61 in order to ensure his ‘international’ legitimacy.
In other words, by learning to act first, largely owing to the country’s relative
economic stability and popular legitimacy of the president, Lukashenko’s regime
has developed an enviable immunity to democratic change, associated with the
wave of coloured revolutions in the neighbourhood.62
Anti-revolutionary measures
However, this is not to contend that Lukashenko’s regime did not take any immedi-
ate precautionary measures in order to ensure that the government would survive
the potential turmoil of colour revolutions. On the contrary, actions to prevent
‘orange contagion’ in Belarus were well calculated and painstakingly followed
through, thus turning Lukashenko’s statement that ‘there will be no rose,
orange, or banana revolution in Belarus’63 into a categorical imperative for the
government to act promptly and to be in full control of the situation. Early
precautionary measures included intensified state propaganda through ‘countless
reports, documentaries, propaganda broadcasts, and newspaper articles to
explain to the population the official take on the revolutions’.64 Particularly
influential in setting the popular anti-revolutionary mood were TV broadcasts





























Azarionok, portraying the battle between the president and the opposition ‘bought
out by the West’. More subtle productions included a series of documentaries
Belarus: The Look from Outside and Fifteen reviewing social and economic
developments in the former Soviet Union and beyond, and praising the achieve-
ments of Lukashenko’s government.65 Pop-propaganda66 also intensified in the
form of mass concerts and other entertainment (street parades, sports events,
harvest festivals) delivering images of green-and-red ‘flag-waving’ happy
crowds and official establishment faces mingling with commoners to counteract
the effect of orange or any other revolutionary colour used in the neighbourhood
to entice the public: for example, a technique also effectively deployed by Nazar-
baev in Kazakhstan to counteract revolution.67
Furthermore, early precautions also included some ‘hard measures’, for
example, by putting a considerable part of the Belarusian army onto a full security
alert. In particular, following the Kyrgyz events, in March 2005, the president
requested full military mobilization of the 28 battalion in Baranovichi (near
Minsk), and additionally recalled 2000 reserve troops into military action.68
Security forces also intensified their input in the struggle against the colour
revolution. Notably, in December 2005 the KGB, which still functions under
the same infamous name in Belarus, issued a document titled ‘Analytical
report on colour revolutions: a possible scenario for Belarus’, prepared for disse-
mination in the House of Representatives for the MPs to ‘work’ with their
respective constituencies in order to prevent the occurrence of unrest. As KGB
chairman General Stephan Sukhorenko commented on 2 December 2005: ‘We
have sufficient information to disseminate to our deputies, so that they can
prepare their electors and inform them of our understanding of the situation’.69
The analytical report contained detailed information on how colour revolutions
occurred in the region (paying particular attention to Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan),
who organized them and how precisely they were staged in order to overthrow
existing governments. According to the report, a revolution would be staged to
follow four crucial steps in order to achieve leadership replacement: from facil-
itating popular perception of incumbency as tyrannical to exposing elections as
fraudulent and demanding justice by taking people’s protest to the streets. The
report also offered some details of the possible toppling of Lukashenko’s
regime and what precautionary measures needed be taken in order to prevent
such activities.70
On the eve of the presidential election, on 19 March 2006, every mobile phone
user in Minsk received a text message cautioning against attending demonstrations
organized by the opposition, and suggesting that all participants of unlawful
protests would be ‘severely battered’.71 A day earlier General Sukhovenko pub-
licly announced that all participants of unauthorized public actions during or
after the election would be charged under the Terrorist Act and could be subject
to 20 years imprisonment. He further insisted that the KGB discovered a secret
plot involving the opposition staging protests against the president and even





























The official propaganda went into full swing on the day of the election and
thereafter: the official media distributed fabricated images of homosexuals and
drug addicts, and even alleged that contagious diseases were spreading in
October Square where the tents were staged.73 The spin continued after the
crackdown on the demonstrators: the official media broadcast pictures of riot
policemen and official TV crews violently beaten by opposition supporters and
hospitalized with severe head and chest injuries. Furthermore, according to
Wilson,74 ‘Lukashenko’s “technologists” added the anti-Polish element and
successfully demonised Milinkevich [the then leader of the united opposition]
as a stooge of the Vatican and Warsaw kresy75 – politics, as well as the USA.
Milinkevich’s popularity in foreign capitals was therefore a double-edged sword.’
On the day of the election, in order to handle the prospect of civilian disquiet,
Lukashenko recalled to full alert 110,000 paramilitary forces (especially to handle
the aftermath of the election), including OMON, a special force branch, which
were further supplemented by a significant number of reserves, and a newly estab-
lished special police force led by Colonel Dmitry Pavlichenko, who was allegedly
involved in commanding ‘death squads’ aimed at murdering Lukashenko’s
prominent opponents. Furthermore, as reported by other sources,76 Lukashenko’s
personal bodyguard force was activated to include about 200 enlisted men,
‘specially trained and equipped with cutting edge technology’,77 and selected on
grounds of personal loyalty to the president. Additionally, a powerful and highly
secretive SWAT team, ‘Alma’, belonging to the Ministry of Interior and paramili-
tary quick reaction squad SOBR were on full alert to counteract any insurgence.
None of the above forces, however, was deployed (or even seen on the streets),
except for Colonel Dmitry Pavlichenko’s squad used to disband the demonstration
of a few thousand people led by Kozulin during Freedom Day on 25 March 2006.
Nevertheless, protestors still faced paramilitary batons and the threat of rubber
bullets, allegedly fired at some by Pavlichenko’s brigade from carabines C-23
‘Selezen’ designed for shooting with rubber bullets and gas.78
This was the only occasion where the state used moderate force to counteract
civic unrest. There were other ‘localized’ and small-scale clashes with the parami-
litary police, however, generally speaking, public demonstrations (including the
disbursement of the tent city) were handled in a moderately peaceful manner by
the authorities and paramilitary forces (some of which – especially the Pavli-
chenko squad – were known for their extreme brutality and violence).
This relatively mild and controlled response from the authorities to hitherto
unprecedented (for Belarus) levels of public protest was quite unexpected, thus
taking the opposition by surprise. The Russian media subsequently commented
that ‘Batska’s [Nation’s Father] opponents awaited brutal oppression of the
protests: they had been warned about this in advance . . . However, there was an
impression that neither Kozulin, nor Milinkevich was ready for this peaceful reac-
tion, and could not handle the crowds sensibly’.79 Apparently, ‘militia behaved
reservedly, no OMON forces were seen on the square, and although threatened,





























observers noted that despite Batska’s quite emotional personality,81 the authorities
stayed in control of the ‘revolutionary situation’ in Belarus by integrating all their
resources (from military readiness to the effective use of state propaganda) into a
coordinated response to thwart political unrest in the making:
Belarus has demonstrated a relatively new phenomenon for the post-soviet space –
how to counteract a planned but unaccomplished revolution. . .The state and civil
society in Belarus were too robust to be subverted by the political crisis developing
on its doorsteps.82
Therefore, there was nothing surprising in Lukashenko’s ‘elegant and convincing’
victory in presidential election83 and his peaceful curbing of the planned but failed
electoral revolution in the country.
What was surprising instead was the limited use of coercion and violence in
these clearly volatile and nerve-racking circumstances for the autocratic leadership
in the region. One commentator noted: ‘In order to defeat Lukashenko, his
opponents need to learn to win heart and minds not only of intelligentsia, business-
men and students, but also of someone like tetia Natasha. . .[who said] “Of course I
voted for Lukashenko. Because we are now used to him. He is not new, and life has
actually become more stable with him.”’84
Why was an authoritarian response NOT necessary in Belarus?
Accounting for domestic structural factors thus not only elicits some general
explanation of why revolutions fail or succeed in the region and beyond, but
also suggests the need to ‘contextualize’ democracy promotion in order to under-
stand the regime’s endurance and its logic for survival in each ‘non-colour’ case.
There is little doubt that Lukashenko’s government has used all its resources to
build a regime, which many would describe as ‘legitimate’, that is, enjoying
extensive public support.85 Through autocratic suppression, institutional means
of prevention, government economic performance, active propaganda and a
growing sense of cultural identity amongst the Belarusians – identity mastered
by the president – Lukashenko has managed to achieve an enviable balance
between his government and the Belarusians at large, expressed through public
endorsement of his regime. People now evaluate his and others’ performance
(that of home-grown opposition and of governments in their neighbourhood)
through the actions (and the outcome these actions entail – usually of order and
stability) of their own president, with lasting and largely negative perceptions of
any external or internal challenges for the incumbency.86 It would be absolutely
true to say that the specificity of Lukashenko’s regime lies with (i) his own
actions that he clearly directed to safeguard his authority over the years, including
achieving relative economic stability in the country; and more crucially, (ii) with
his own electorate which proved to be so malleable for responding to Lukashenko’s





























genuine legitimacy: ‘rule is legitimate when its subjects believe it to be so’.87 As
our 2011 post-election nationwide survey indicates, Lukashenko still remains
popular (44% – four times greater than all other candidates) among the general
population – that is, despite the bloody aftermath of the December 2010
presidential election, and the imprisonment of almost all the presidential
candidates.88
In this section I will briefly explore what makes Lukashenko’s regime legiti-
mate – the people/president bond, which naturally reduces the need for the
regime to utilize state coercion extensively. More broadly, I will also examine
the normative foundations of the Belarusian society that have made Lukashenko’s
phenomenon possible and even flourishing in Belarusian conditions.
Regime’s legitimacy
Lukashenko is and will remain absolutely legitimate if people continue to identify
with him and appreciate his relatively successful social and economic policies
directed at supporting communal well-being, security and stability.89 Popular
perception that, in a situation of total collapse, the country could only be saved
by the president – rather than any other existing or possible agency – clearly
makes the regime unwaveringly stable.
Belarus, like many other countries, has been hit hard by the economic crisis, but
the effects of the global economic downturn have not yet fully resonated with the
society at large, and many still feel stable and secure under Lukashenko’s leader-
ship.90 Over a third of the polled population still believe that the state of the
economy in Belarus is sound; with another 43% feeling neutral towards the
overall economic performance of their country.91 Over two thirds of the population
state that their family income is relatively stable (67%) and a healthy plurality
observe (46%) that it has not changed in the past year, with another 24% even
declaring a slight improvement.
On balance, more people believe (over 60%) that the country is stable and
developing in the right direction (as against 24% who think otherwise). Overall,
about 40% of the respondents perceive their president’s actions as complete or
rather satisfactory, with another third feeling neutral or hesitant, which serves as
a clear sign of the continuity of the president’s legitimacy in Belarus in 2011.
Furthermore, if one were to choose between economic well-being and democ-
racy/independence, well-being comes first: almost 70% (as against 22%) concur
with the importance of the former. Therefore, people’s positive preferences for
Lukashenko come as no surprise: due to the relative efficacy of his regime and
his convincing political discourse, he continues to remain the sole alternative on
the Belarusian political landscape.
Why do people vote for Lukashenko? In 200892 they simply believed that
he was successful in restoring order in society (66.3%), in building an indepen-
dent and economically viable state (64.5%), in promoting collaboration within





























fighting crime (58.9%) and corruption (49.6%). In comparison with Soviet
times, people (08/2006) also see the incumbent authority as ‘close to the
people’ (30.4%), less bureaucratic (25.5%), strong and reliable (23.6%) as
well as lawful (23.2%).
Moreover, people seem to identify with their president knowingly – that is,
despite being aware of government corruption, allegations of political murder,
media manipulation and the absolute power the president has (including being
above the law) in the country. This conscious choice of the Belarusians remains
a mystery to many students of politics. How can Belarusians knowingly identify
and support Lukashenko’s regime – in many eyes, an oppressive, murderous,
and by many accounts, a stupefying order?
Common sense and logic suggest that indeed what Belarusians seem to treasure
most is their personal security, given the legacies of the past instability and
hardship – personal security above newly attained sovereignty and personal free-
doms and rights. This is duly reflected in their ‘strategic choice’ of leadership.
Belarusians ‘have bread and butter’ daily on the table, they are in full employment
with regularly paid wages and pensions;93 they are lavishly entertained by the state,
and cared for through various (although limited) social benefits. They have made
their choice of leadership because this government does not abuse/harass them
individually, and because they know that in the absence of any eligible alternative,
Lukashenko is their best bet.
Being different?
There is however more to this ‘strategic choice’ of leadership. This kind of prefer-
ence for strong, orderly and authoritarian government seems common for many
East European transient states vulnerable to change and desiring stability, and
has far deeper roots – going well beyond pre-emptive actions of the regime
itself – in society.94 As our research indicates,95 many countries of the former
Soviet Union demonstrate an enduring proclivity for strong leadership and
adherence to other-than-liberal values – those of community, tolerance, cultural
heritage, etc. as opposed to democracy, lawfulness and human rights – which
invariably make them different and so less susceptible to values and ideals of the
liberal democracy, as practised by the West.
Interestingly, the normative disjunction between the West and the former
Soviet Union96 is not simply an intellectual contestation, or a projected discourse
of autocratic governments in an attempt to justify their authoritarian policies. As
the absolute majority of the respondents in many case studies indicated, this is
deeply rooted in public perceptions whereby people clearly and uncompromisingly
differentiate between Western values – of market economy, human rights,
democracy and lawfulness – and their own values – of peace, tolerance, respect
for cultural heritage and religion.97
This naturally leads to questioning the overall logic of democracy promotion





























democracies and their respective vested interests.98 As Lane contends: ‘Western
interests are involved in these processes – in support of groups, in Margaret
Thatcher’s terms, “with whom we can do business”, or from a geo-strategic
point of view, to change allegiances in favour of the West’.99 The logical questions
are (i) that of mutual reciprocity and indeed receptivity – that is, whether there is
any common normative denominator between the aiding and the receiving sides –
and (ii) whether one set of arguably more virtuous values can be successfully
installed in those societies which for generations have followed a different (and
often contested) path of democratic development – the path premised on different
values and in many cases evincing a legitimate consensus between the people and
their government.
A new scholarship is now emerging to contest the concept of liberal democracy
and democracy promotion per se,100 which insists on exposing not only the posi-
tive but also the negative forms and practices of democracy, and on the need to
pluralize and contextualize democracy in each given case. It is to be hoped that
this will engender a better understanding of why some transition countries may
resist generous and gratuitous aid, and may even find some Western efforts offen-
sive in their attempt to change what may be externally seen as ‘rogue’ or an
‘outpost of tyranny’, but internally, for what it is worth, is a perceivably legitimate
order for many people in the other-than-liberal states.
Conclusions
In this article the experience of the colour revolutions in Eastern Europe, and
Belarus in particular, has been examined. In the light of the continuing political
turmoil and in some cases, an increased authoritarian clampdown on genuine
non-confrontational forms of civic activities in the region, we have questioned
the real success of the first colour revolutions in bringing about political change,
let alone democratization. The all-colour endeavours in Georgia, Ukraine and
Kyrgyzstan, and later on in many more countries of the former Soviet Union,
may have been democratic in their mobilization, but they evidently failed to
wield any system change and thus can be more suitably theorized as ‘revolutionary
coup d’e´tat’, intending leadership replacement with some public support to ensure
legitimacy of the ‘new order’. ‘These revolutionary coup d’e´tats . . . involve the rise
of different elite groups, clans or families, which seek to redistribute the assets of
the previous regime’101 and are duly promoted by theWest, as those ‘whomwe can
do business with’.102
The colour revolutions clearly demonstrated that international diffusion of the
foreign-led revolutionary experience in the region, even if underpinned by an
impressive financial backing and enthusiastic training of the revolutionaries, is
an insufficient and inadequate tool to instigate change in Eastern Europe.103A
careful account of domestic structural factors is needed in order to understand
why so many colour revolutions, of the second generation (2005–2009) especially,





























insisted that both pluralization of the meaning of democracy and the contextualiza-
tion of democracy promotion in each given case is essential in order to evaluate the
readiness for and the willingness of change by a particular regime, and what kind of
change in actual fact is desired.
Belarus has undermined theWestern ‘logic’ of democracy promotion premised
on templates and sponsorship, and by many accounts, offered a relatively conven-
tional authoritarian ‘response’ to the attempted revolution on its doorsteps. The
regime has evidently learned (through long- and short-term measures) how to
defend itself and, more remarkably, it has developed skills of how to do so legiti-
mately, without resorting to extensive coercion, so often anticipated from the ‘out-
posts of tyranny’. The article has argued that Belarusian authorities, by undertaking
certain immediate precautionary measures during the presidential election in
March 2006, managed to maintain the status quo in a relatively peaceful and
non-aggressive manner.104 Effective learning by regimes, however, is only one
side of the story, which would be incomplete without analysis of the internal
(domestic) conditions that created the propitious environment for the survival
and endurance of the Lukashenko regime.
It has been argued that the incumbency in Belarus is unmistakably premised on
the precarious legitimacy that gives Lukashenko’s regime an enviable immunity
and had effectively conditioned public withdrawal from the attempts at electoral
mobilization during elections. The origin of this legitimacy is many-fold and not
least dependent on the efficacy of the regime and its deliverables. However, the
essential part of the governing consensus has nevertheless been deeply rooted in
the historical/traditional values of the society itself, the manifestation of which
has been so perplexingly well epitomized by Lukashenko himself. Therefore, in
order to exercise democracy promotion effectively (if such a thing is at all possible)
a far deeper understanding of autocratic narratives is needed, concomitant with a
much closer analysis of local societal norms and values as well as of a country’s
geopolitical resources and strategies.
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96. The normative disjunction is far broader than is suggested here, and embraces all
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97. For more information see Korosteleva, Eastern Partnership. Case studies included
interviews with politicians, focus groups and nation-wide surveys. A synopsis of
research findings can be found at http://www.aber.ac.uk/en/interpol/research/
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103. Please see fn. 29 for further information. Note that ‘unpacking Western support’ was
not the purpose of the article. Instead, the focus was on why Lukashenko’s regime
survived the colour revolutions relatively unchallenged.
104. The December 2010 presidential election and especially its aftermath, however, offer
a somewhat different picture of authorities’ response to the public uprising – more
violent, more brutal and spontaneous. The analysis of recent events in Belarus,
however, is beyond the scope of this article.
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